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*Milestones
3e. Tactical*

DCI/IC 74-1017

8 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham

SUBJECT : National/Tactical Intelligence Interface
Review

1. The attached papers are [redacted] comments on the present national/tactical intelligence situation and a plan based on several discussions he and I have had on the best way to proceed in the second phase. I am also attaching a copy of how I believe we should time the second phase in the "objectives" paper.

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2. Marty's comments on the present situation are sound but tell you little you did not already know.

3. The plan seems a reasonable approach as long as we test it out on one area (or U&S Command) on a trial basis to see how it works. Besides, to tackle the world all at once would give JCS and the Services a tremendous amount to swallow in one gulp. The approach I have Pat Hannifin's informal agreement to would be to try [redacted] a test. It is reasonably representative and would not be as massive as Europe or Pacific.

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4. Although it depends on continued JCS/Service cooperation, the Milestones listed in the Objective may be attainable. The test approach enables us to come up with a piece of paper a lot sooner than we could get one if we took on the world right away.


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If you come up, I will check this out in detail with Pat before any meeting.

[redacted]
Rear Admiral, USN
Director, Coordination
Staff/Secretariat

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : A Plan for The Tactical/National Intelligence Interface Study

1. The Starting Point:

a. The JCS paper on the tactical/national intelligence interface, now awaiting SecDef approval, barely scratches the surface of the tactical/national intelligence problem. Of the six points that the JCS were to address in their study (outlined in paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Agreement of 2 November 1973), only two were approached, and these only partly.

b. The principal criterion for identifying the non-CDIP assets that were to be considered in the study was simply whether or not an asset was dedicated to its parent organization or other combat units. If it was "dedicated," it was excluded.

c. The JCS considered only Programs 1, 2 and 5 intelligence assets. The whole world of intelligence R&D, and major headquarters staffs and their production capability were not considered. The examination of the major Defense programs that were addressed was cursory, at best. As a result, the JCS initial effort will provide the IC Staff little or no new information on so-called tactical intelligence assets.

d. The JCS made no effort to identify the intelligence requirements of the operating forces, or the support available from national sources (although total CIRIS data was available to them). There could be, therefore, no judgment regarding how non-CDIP and national assets might be mutually supporting.

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e. Substantively, we are where we started on 2 November 1973. Culturally, significant progress has been made. First, however imperfect the JCS effort, it is more than has ever before been officially released outside the JCS arena. The precedent is set; substantial progress is probable. Second, the JCS action officers and their principals have had a considerable education. They have faced the fact that the DCI has a legitimate need to know, and they have been forced to examine intelligence support relationships to the commands.

f. Service reluctance to be forthcoming on the tactical side of the study stems from legitimate concerns. These are, essentially: (1) concern that command force support intelligence assets could be largely diverted from their primary missions to satisfy national needs; (2) concern that intelligence funding could be centralized across-the-board, taking from the Services the responsibility for resource decisions for intelligence support assets integral to the operating forces; and (3) concern that if made visible at the OSD or DCI level, force support intelligence assets would be traded for national assets that could not support the forces in a timely and usable manner.

2. The Next Phase:

a. Clearly, if the study continues on its present course, we will end up with many words and no substance. To change direction, we have to either overcome or bypass the traditional Service hang-ups regarding intelligence assets integral to the operating forces.

b. A head-on collision would be impractical. The JCS have withstood since at least 1963 all attempts to identify and categorize force support intelligence assets, even within the Defense arena. Although it appears certain that the DCI would prevail eventually, it would be a long and frustrating battle.

c. We should bypass the problem of identifying the so-called tactical intelligence assets, and concentrate next on the in-depth identification of the intelligence needs of the operating forces, and the national capabilities that can be applied to their satisfaction -- points three and four under the scope of the Agreement. It seems inevitable that a reasonable inventory of non-CDIP assets would be a fall-out. An honest examination of the tactical intelligence needs must of necessity touch the organic assets available for their satisfaction.

Yes,

d. There is a danger that the examination of command intelligence needs could be as cursory as the initial JCS effort to inventory assets. We must make certain that we identify specific requirements, and that the factors of accuracy and timeliness, as well as information needs, are considered for each level of command capable of sustained, independent combat operations. Participation by the U&S and component commands is necessary.

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e. The determination of national assets that can support field commanders will require an examination of not only technical capabilities, but details of their present and contingency missions, and the circumstances under which they could be diverted. During this examination, questions will arise regarding the usefulness of some of the national requirements and the priorities assigned to them. The USIB and its committees will have to be prepared to resolve these problems.

3. Getting on With It:

a. It will take time to do the next phase well; months will be required to sift through the EEI of the tactical commands and match to them the appropriate national capabilities. To abbreviate the scope of this phase, or work only from generalized statements of priorities and capabilities (such as the JCS intelligence objectives and the CIRIS data) would defeat the purpose of the study and deny the national intelligence leadership the understanding of substantive tactical intelligence needs necessary to make judicious resource judgments regarding force intelligence support assets.

b. (U) A plan for the next phase is attached.



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Attachment

A PLAN FOR THE TACTICAL/NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE STUDY

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1. This plan for the second phase of the tactical/national intelligence interface study addresses national intelligence support to tactical commanders, and the establishment of data base for non-CDIP intelligence assets. It is responsive to the third and fourth steps of the scope of the study stated in paragraph 5 of the Agreement of 2 November 1973, and to steps a. and b., paragraph 2, of the D/DCI/IC memorandum of 15 April 1974 on the Tactical/National Intelligence Interface.

2. This plan covers three tasks to be accomplished simultaneously by separate working groups. These tasks are: (a) identify the intelligence requirements of the operating forces, (b) identify the capabilities of the national intelligence assets, and (c) establish a non-CDIP intelligence data base. The working groups for the substantive tasks will include representatives of each of the military services, the J-5 JCS, the DIA, the NSA/, the DMA and the DIS. DIA will chair the Tactical/National Intelligence Requirements Working Group. The IC Staff will chair the National Intelligence Capabilities Working Group. The non-CDIP intelligence data base will be created by the Research and Analysis Branch of the IC Staff in collaboration with the J-5 JCS, and with the assistance of the Services and intelligence agencies, as necessary. All members of the working groups will, as a minimum, have access to the compartmented information specified in the D/DCI/IC memorandum of 15 April 1974.

3. Tactical/National Intelligence Requirements
Working Group

a. Identify the peacetime, contingency and wartime essential elements of information (EEI) for each command capable of independent and sustained combat and having an operational mission in a SIOP-tasked unified or specified command area of operations.

b. Translate the EEI into statements of intelligence needs in terms of timeliness, accuracy, and areas of operations; consolidate like needs where appropriate.

c. For each statement of intelligence need, identify the national and non-CDIP intelligence assets tasked in war and contingency plans for its satisfaction.

d. Coordinate the statements of intelligence needs and intelligence tasking with the SIOP-tasked unified, specified and component commands, and their subordinate commands, as appropriate.

e. Prepare for the Chairman, JCS, and for the D/DCI/IC a comprehensive report of findings for each SIOP-tasked unified and specified command, identifying the forces and their intelligence needs by areas of operations within the unified and specified command area of responsibility.

4. The National Intelligence Capabilities Working Group:

a. Identify each national intelligence asset, and its specific targets, with a mission in or against the areas of responsibility and intelligence interest of the SIOP-tasked unified and specified commands for peacetime, contingency or wartime operations.

b. Determine the capability for timeliness and accuracy of each identified asset to provide information or to produce intelligence with respect to each of its targets for each operational environment.

c. Determine the additional targets in each SIOP-tasked unified and specified command area of interest and responsibility that can be tasked to national intelligence assets with no degradation to their primary missions; consider accuracy and timeliness of reporting.

d. Identify the peacetime national intelligence missions that could be safely reduced or terminated in wartime and in contingency situations, and the additional targets in unified and specified command areas of interest and responsibility that could be undertaken in their place.

e. Coordinate the statements of national intelligence asset capabilities with the operators of the individual systems and the consumers of their products, as appropriate.

f. For each national intelligence asset, identify the restrictions that may preclude the dissemination of information/intelligence to tactical commanders, and recommend procedures to overcome the restrictions.

g. Prepare for the Chairman, JCS, and for the D/DCI/IC a comprehensive report of findings on the capabilities of each national intelligence asset against targets in the SIOP-tasked unified and specified command areas of interest and responsibility, the restrictions that may limit their usefulness to tactical commanders, and recommendations to mitigate or overcome such restrictions.

5. The Non-CDIP Intelligence Data Base:

a. Design and establish a CIRIS-compatible program to manipulate the data on non-CDIP intelligence assets that are generated by this study, and to correlate them with parallel data in the CIRIS data base.

b. Design and implement an extention of the CIRIS program to accommodate the detailed data on national intelligence assets that are generated by this study.

c. Provide data support to the substantive working groups, as required.

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6. Coordination by the substantive working groups with field commanders and project operators should begin on 1 September 1974. Completed reports of findings should be delivered to the Chairman, JCS and to the D/DCI/IC by 1 December 1974.

7. The subsequent phase of this study effort will address the contribution that non-CDIP intelligence assets can make to national intelligence needs.

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7 May 1974

OBJECTIVE NO. 10

Make further progress in improving the relationship between national and tactical intelligence assets in the interest of providing maximum support for both national intelligence users and the operational field commands without unnecessary redundancy in use of resources. (This is seen as a three-year program.)

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1 July 1974

Working in concert with the Joint Chief of Staff, establish: (1) a joint national/tactical intelligence requirements task group to identify the peacetime, contingency and wartime essential elements of information of a representative military field commander; (2) a national intelligence capabilities task group to determine and quantify the capabilities of national intelligence systems to satisfy the intelligence needs of military commanders; (3) a joint task group to design and establish a common data base to incorporate identified tactical and national intelligence resources and to support the two substantive task groups.

1 September 1974

Initiate combined functioning of the requirements task group and the capabilities working group.

1 October 1974

Complete statement of the representative military commander's intelligence requirements and the national intelligence capabilities to respond to those requirements. Utilizing lessons learned in representative command test effort, initiate requirements/capabilities study of remaining areas.

1 February 1975

Initiate combined functioning of the requirements and capabilities working groups

1 July 1975

Formulate recommendations in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense to enhance assurance that the needs of national intelligence and of military operations are met without unnecessary duplication.

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